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Title III: Corporate Responsibility -Public Company Audit Committees


Sarbox requires creation of an audit committee comprising of independent directors of the issuer company.  The issuer's audit PAF is put under the control of the audit committee.
The CEO and the CFO of the issuer company shall sign a statement to accompany the audit report certifying that:
o The report does not contain untrue statements or material omissions o
The financial statements fairly present the financial condition and the results of operations. o Such officers are responsible for internal controls of the issuer and its subsidiaries. o
The internal controls are reviewed for their effectiveness within 90 days prior to the report o Any significant changes to the internal control are reported.
 Violators of SEC rules will be barred from serving as directors of any issuer.  Attorneys appearing before the SEC are to report any violations of securities laws by a public company to the chief legal counsel or the CEO of the company, or directly to the SEC.
Title IV: Enhanced Financial Disclosures

Reports filed with the SEC must include all material off-balance sheet transactions and relationships that may have material effect on the financial status of an issuer.  Prohibits loans to be extended to senior executives.  Title IV also includes the Notorious Section 404 which requires annual statement of issuer to contain an Internal Control Report which shall: o state that the management is responsible for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting. o contain an assessment of the effectiveness of the internal controls.
 Each issuer's auditor shall attest to and report on the assessment made by the management. 
REACTIONS TO SARBANES -OXLEY ACT OF 2002
Critics of SOX argue that the cost of compliance with the Section 404 requirement of companies to prove that they have an adequate system of internal control to prevent mistakes and fraud is too onerous. Yet, many benefits were reported because of SOX. According to a survey conducted by CFO Research Services in collaboration with PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2005), companies were found to be reaping some unexpected benefits from the law that many have found to be challenging. Their compliance efforts have been revealing material weaknesses in controls and business processes enabling them to accelerate their efforts to remedy the problems. Nearly two-thirds of the respondents in the survey reported that the SOX compliance effort has increased their understanding of their business and their ability to communicate such understanding across the organization. Key executives are now able to exhibit a greater awareness of their responsibilities for compliance and control (www.pwc.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf). Henry et al, (2005) , also found evidence that intense scrutiny under SOX compliance requirements is revealing lingering problems in the companies' operating methods. Timely fixing of weaknesses in the financial controls is helping to nip the problems in the bud. As Saville, et al. (2002) observe, the Act does not alter the substantive standards for indictment or conviction, nor does it render any act criminal that was not unlawful under the already existing securities laws. It has however substantially increased the sentences for white-collar crimes.
THE HIGH COST OF SOX SECTION 404: COMPLAINTS AGAINST SOX.
The act contains many corporate governance reforms. The vast majority of the Act's provisions are positive, but the many benefits are being eclipsed by section 404. A survey by NASDAQ (2005) Large and small companies complain that the interpretation of Section 404 by auditors is overly broad, costing them many hours and millions of dollars in fees to document for example, such things as who has access to an office key (Schuman, 2006) . Compliance costs may vary with the size of the company. According to Soloman (2005), Companies with less than $1 million in market capitalization are expected to pay an average of about $820,000 to comply with the requirements of Section 404. For companies with revenue of less than $1 billion, the average annual cost of being a public company in fiscal 2004 more than tripled to $3.4 million, because of SOX. Solomon (2005) states that by far the biggest part of compliance costs are those associated with Rule 404. "The rule requires public companies to perform internal reviews of their control systems and then hire an outside auditor to verify the review findings. Critics hold that this results in a duplication of efforts and a doubling of companies' costs," (Solomon, 2005) . Arndt (2004) declares that SOX is turning out to be a boon to bean counters (public accounting firms). According to Whalen (2003) , Americans must live with a law that greatly expands government regulation of financial markets but probably does nothing to protectors from future acts of fraud. The Law forces lawyers, directors and accountants to police corporate behavior. Under SOX, lawyers are forced into a situation where they end up turning in their own clients to the SEC. The accused is presumed to guilty until proven innocent The Law is like a dinner bell for the trial lawyers. Chapman (2004) states that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 , passed with virtually no debate, is based on several faulty premises -that business is bad, that the CEOs and the management are criminals, and that experienced and knowledgeable directors who understand a company's business are tainted.
Steve Forbes (2005) recently delivered a scathing criticism of Sox as follows:
 Sarbox is a destructive piece of legislation, rushed through congress in the aftermath of the World Com debacle. This ill-thought, hastily written law has cost shareholders and the US economy infinitely more money than Bernie Ebbers and his ilk ever did.  SOX imposes hefty costs on publicly held companies. It has become a boon to the accounting industry since in many cases fees have doubled or even tripled.  It is not only the billions of dollars of mostly wasted money but the long periods of time top management is spending in trying to comply with Section 404 instead of focusing on running their businesses.

The law has inhibited risk taking. Directors and executives must now ask themselves how a particular corporate decision looks in a court of law. The onerous requirements of SOX fall disproportionately on small and mid-cap companies which are the most innovative and entrepreneurial drivers of change in our economy. According to Wallison (2006) , "the most far-reaching effect of Sarbox may be indirect and intangible. By placing a congressional Imprimatur on the notion that managements have to be supervised and controlled by independent boards, the act may have set up an adversarial relationship between managements and boards that will, over time, impair corporate risk-taking and thus economic growth."  Sarbox removed a salient pillar of corporate form of business, limited liability. It has brought back the equivalent of the centuries old debtor's prison. Unlimited liability means less risk taking and less economic growth.  Finally, Sox miserably flunks the cost-benefit analysis too.
DISADVANTAGE IN GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS
Schuman (2006) observes that since the time the law was enacted, a growing chorus of critics claimed that Sarbanes-Oxley Act went too far, saddling companies with costly and unnecessary auditing requirements that put U. S. registered companies and the U. S. markets at a global disadvantage. Wallison (2006) by Foley and Lardner found that 20% of public companies are considering going private just to avoid Sarbox compliance. As Factor (2006) states, "it is no wonder, then, that the London Stock Exchange (LSE) -eager to exploit a competitive advantage -now promotes itself by reminding companies that by listing on the LSE they are not subject to Sarbox." Murray (2006) notes that nine out of ten largest Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) this year, and 24 out of 25 largest, last year, were done in overseas markets. That is a remarkable change from the 1990s, when the vast majority of IPOs were made in the U. S. financial markets (Murray, 2006) . Obviously, something is wrong. As Wallison (2006) observes, Sox and its ancillary SEC Regulations contributed to a recent Security Industry Estimate that the industry spends $25 billion annually on SEC compliance. These costs are naturally passed on to persons and companies that use the U. S. securities markets. A recent study by the London Stock Exchange showed that underwriting costs in London were roughly half of those in the U. S.! Congressman Feeny and Senator DeMint (2006) state that some businesses which were public when the Sox was passed have since then opted to cut off their access to capital rather than comply with SOX. 
SUGGETED REMEDIES AND CONCLUSION
It is widely recognized that the costs of Sarbox clearly outweigh its benefits. The Sarbanes -Oxley Act of 2002 was passed in haste by Congress as a knee jerk response in the wake of large scale corporate implosions at Enron, WorldCom etc. SOX is a piece of legislation enacting the most sweeping anti-fraud corporate reforms since the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. It is generally agreed up on that such checks and balances embedded in SOX are long over due. However, the provisions on internal control in Section 404 have caused untold misery to a large section of the corporate world. The intent of SOX may be laudable but the law made no distinction between a billion dollar, large-cap company and $75 million dollar, small-cap company. The law is affecting the ability of our small and mid-cap companies, the back-bone of our economy, to compete in the global markets. SOX Section 404 audits are almost entirely focused on micro-operational details of the firm and are most likely to miss the kind of financial legerdemain orchestrated at the top management level that have previously led to the scandalous bankruptcies of Enron, WorldCom and others. The greatest SOX irony according to Whalen (2003) is that its main beneficiaries are the same big accounting firms that the politicians blamed for Enron, WorldCom type of scandals. The big four public accounting firms audit the majority of public companies. The feds killed Arthur Anderson for its many sins of Enron. But its offending partners simply scooted over to one of the other firms and are now laughing all the way to their vacation homes.
Several remedies are being put forward in the intense debate over Sarbox. The lawsuit about Sarbox's constitutionality, if successful, would mandate sweeping legislative reforms to Sarbox. Former Senators, Bob Dole and Tom Daschle (2005) suggest that congress could consider tailoring the certification process to provide for less costly alternatives for smaller businesses. The recommendations of the SEC Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies would, if implemented, bring a much sought after relief to small and mid-cap companies from the vagaries of Sarbox. Powell (2005) suggests a suitable solution to the SOX provisions of Section 404. He says that Congress can correct the overreach of SOX by simply making Section 404 mandates on internal controls voluntary, while keeping the rest of the provisions of SOX intact. He suggests that such a scaled-back SOX would help keep the U. S. businesses competitive in the world markets while reaffirming the primacy of free market initiatives and innovation.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
There is an up roar against the hardships wrought upon U. S. firms by Sarbox, specifically by the mandates of the notorious Section 404 pertaining to compliance of internal control requirements. Some benefits were recognized resulting from the enactment of Sarbox, but present literature on the Act claims that the costs of the Act far outweigh the benefits. Further research on the effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on U. S. companies needs to be conducted to determine whether the increased costs of implementing the provisions of Sarbox outweigh the benefits visualized by the legislation.
